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Introduction The projection problem for presupposition [Langendoen and Savin 1971] con-
sists in determining the presupposition of complex expressions based on their parts. For in-
stance, a presupposition of the consequent of a conditional may project as in (1a), be cancelled
as in (1b), or weakened as in (1c) (which presupposes If John is 64 years old, he can’t be hired).
(1) a. If the problem was difficult, then Morton isn’t the one who solved it. [Soames 1982]
b. If the king has a son, the king’s son is bald. [Heim 1983]
c. If John is 64 years old, he knows that he can’t be hired. [Schlenker 2011.a]
Satisfaction theories, such as [Heim 1983], systematically predict that conditionals give rise
to weak conditional presuppositions, for presuppositions triggered in the consequent and not en-
tailed by the antecedent. This intuitively incorrect result (see (1a)) is what [Geurts 1996] dubbed
the Proviso Problem. For this reason, pragmatic mechanisms that strengthen the predicted
conditional presuppositions have been proposed (see for instance [von Fintel 2008]). Besides
the fact that the efficiency of such mechanisms is contested [Geurts 1996, Mandelkern 2016],
this strategy decomposes presuppositions into a rigorously formalised semantic component and
a less formal pragmatic component, with the semantics-pragmatics interface not being fully
specified. Other theories, such as DRT [van der Sandt 1992] or more recently dissatisfaction
theory [Mandelkern 2016], do not suffer from the Proviso Problem, but then fail to convincingly
explain cases in which a genuine conditional presupposition is observed, as in (1c) or (2).
(2) If you accept this job, will you let your family know that you’re going to be working for
a thug? [Schlenker 2011.b]
The goal What we propose is not a theory of presupposition per se, where this is understood
to entail an explanation of why presuppositions arise and of why connectives and quantifiers af-
fect presuppositions in certain ways; rather, we aim at giving a formal, descriptively accurate
account of presuppositions. We propose a very expressive framework based on continuation
semantics [de Groote 2006, Barker and Shan 2014] in which it is not only possible to simulate
previous theories (such as the predictions of satisfaction theory or DRT) but also to get new,
arguably more accurate, results, by modifying the lexical entries (connectives, quantifiers, pre-
supposition plugs, etc.). This framework has the advantage of neatly integrating the pragmatic
processes with the compositional interpretation, as algorithms which, when specified, provide
precise predictions that can be tested.
Continuations Continuations were first studied in the theory of programming languages
and are related to the idea of order of computation. It is interesting to note that the type raising
used in [Montague 1973], for instance, can be seen as a limited form of continuation technique
[Barker 2004]. Using continuations, [de Groote 2006] showed how dynamic behaviour can be
expressed compositionally without the need for dynamic semantics. This is possible because
each term is able to read from, and update, a context variable. In our case, a context c consists
of a list of formula φ1, · · ·φn and represents the formula ∃x1, · · ·xm. φ1∧·· ·∧φm where the xi are
the free variables of the φ j.
Exceptions Building on [de Groote and Lebedeva 2010, Lebedeva 2012], we implement
presupposition projection and accommodation via an exception mechanism. An exception is
a special kind of object, common in programming languages, that when raised, interrupts the
current computation and is transmitted to the closest scoping handler. The presupposition trig-
ger know in (3) tries to prove its presupposition — “Pcstop”, the logical proposition resulting
from evaluating its complement P in context c with the empty continuation stop = λc. > —
from context c; when this succeeds, the assertive content “know(s,Pcstop)” is produced and
the continuation φ is executed with an updated context; otherwise, an exception containing a
reference to the presupposition is raised.
(3) JknowK = λPS. S(λ scφ . if(c  (Pcstop)) : know(s,Pcstop)∧φ(know(s,Pcstop) :: c)
else : raise Presupposition(P))
As mentioned above, an exception projects through the computation tree (i.e., the semantic
tree) until it is caught by a handler. For instance, the following gacc term — an occurrence of
which scopes over each sentence S — executes S and catches any projecting presupposition P
to accommodate it, i.e., to compute P with S as part of its continuation. Note that because P
is accommodated, its content will be added to the context, so that the presupposition trigger is
trivially able to prove it during the second computation and will not raise the exception again.
(4) gacc = λScφ . (Scφ) handle Presupposition(P) with gaccPc(λc′. Sc′φ)
Conditionals Instead of the term JifK1 below from [Lebedeva 2012], we model conditionals
with JifK2 (in the context update, we use “[· · · ]” as a shorthand for “¬(Ac(λc′. ¬Bc′stop))”).
(5) JifK1 = λABcφ . ¬(Ac(λc′. ¬Bc′stop))∧φ([· · · ] :: c)
(6) JifK2 = λABcφ .¬(Ac(λc′. (¬Bc′stop) handle Presupposition(P) with if choiceif (c,P) :
raise Presupposition(P) else : raise Presupposition(JifK1AP)))∧φ([· · · ] :: c)
This term contains a place-holder for an algorithm choiceif whose task is to decide whether
to let a presupposition of the consequent P project or to weaken it as a conditional presupposi-
tion. A trivial algorithm always answering true would lead to a systematically strong presuppo-
sition as in DRT; always answering false results in the Proviso Problem as in satisfaction theory.
Importantly, a non-trivial (and cognitively plausible) choiceif can use the context c, giving rise
to the prediction that the presupposition in (1c) has to be weakened, but not in a context such
that Most applicants simply don’t have the qualifications for the job, which they are usually too
young to realise; thus achieving a level of context-dependence similar (at least) to the one of
[Lassiter 2012], while being able to clearly identify which presupposition is selected.
Discussion We have seen with conditionals how our framework, in which all components
are fully specifiable, can simulate the predictions of previous theories. In a similar way, we are
able to conveniently express how a quantifier (a, each, none) can make a quantified version of
a presupposition project (we are not limited by DRT’s trapping constraint). Also, because we
are dealing with provability of logical formulas and not with sets of possible worlds, we are
free from the usual issues related to logical truth and logical equivalence. For instance, if the
theorem prover invoked with  in (3) above has limited capacity (a reasonable assumption), then
one obtains that an uninformed hearer will interpret (7) as presupposing that there are infinitely
many primes, even though this proposition is a logical truth (so always entailed by the context).
(7) Mary knows that there are infinitely many primes.
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